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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Bar concurs in Barnard's Statement of Jurisdiction. 
II. 
RELATED APPEAL 
Similar issues to the present appeal were briefed and 
argued in Barnard v. Sutliff, Case No. 90-0241, in which the 
Court heard oral argument on November 6, 1991. In Sutliff. this 
Court is considering whether the Third Judicial District Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint Barnard filed 
to compel the Bar to reveal to him names of the members of a 
Screening Panel that was to be involved in an investigation of 
his conduct and whether, under the particular facts of that case, 
the District Court was justified in imposing sanctions on Barnard 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 ("Rule 11"). 
III. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court properly rule that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over Barnard's claims because his 
Complaint sought relief against the Utah State Bar with respect 
to the Bar's investigation of Barnard's conduct and possible 
disciplinary action? 
2. Did the District Court correctly dismiss Barnard's 
Complaint because it did not present a case or controversy ripe 
for adjudication, but merely sought an advisory opinion of the 
District Court? 
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3. Are the individual Defendants judicially immune 
from suit? 
4. Did the District Court act within its discretion in 
imposing Rule 11 sanctions for Barnard's filing of the Complaint 
below? 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The first three issues presented for review are 
questions of law to be reviewed by this Court de novo. The 
fourth, whether the District Court properly imposed Rule 11 
sanctions, should be reviewed by this Court under an abuse of 
discretion standard. See Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 
(10th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah 
App. 1989).1 
Federal case precedents are, of course, persuasive but 
not binding authority before this court. Notably, however, seven 
federal circuits apply an abuse of discretion standard to the 
trial court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Courts employing 
an abuse of discretion standard include the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Federal Circuits. See, e.g., 
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933 
(7th Cir. 1989); Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300, 304 
(Fed. Cir. 1989), cert, den., 110 S. Ct. 154 (1989); Herron v. 
Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1988); Introcaso 
v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965, 969 (4th Cir. 1988); Doering v. 
Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195 (3rd 
Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 
872 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); EBI, Inc. v. Gator Indus., Inc., 
807 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1986); Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 
903 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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V. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution 
Article VIII. g 3 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be 
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs 
and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause. 
Article VIII, S 4 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a 
vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah 
residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme 
Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of 
persons admitted to practice law. 
4 
Article VIII, s 5 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, 
and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, 
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed 
originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an 
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a 
court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1992) (attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1992) (attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Richard Moffat, Judge, dismissing a 
Complaint filed by Appellant Brian M. Barnard ("Barnard") seeking 
an injunction and declaratory relief with respect to an 
investigation commenced by the Bar into certain practices of 
Barnard. 
On or about November 8, 1989, Bar Counsel received from 
Judge Timothy Hanson, a judge of the District Court, two 
5 
transcripts of hearings previously held in his court. Judge 
Hanson felt those proceedings raised a question whether Barnard 
may have been assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. 
Based on that notification and the transcripts, Bar Counsel 
initiated an investigation with a complaint letter dated December 
26, 1990, requesting Barnard to provide information about his 
conduct that had been identified as a possible violation of Rule 
5.5(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Barnard responded 
to Bar Counselfs initial complaint letter with a letter dated 
January 2, 1991, in which Barnard purported to respond and 
provide information concerning the complaint. 
After receiving Barnard's response, Bar Counsel 
requested additional information in a letter dated January 8, 
1991. Rather than respond to Bar Counsel's second letter, 
Barnard filed this lawsuit. 
Barnard's Complaint in this action sought an injunction 
against the Bar to preclude it from further investigating or 
taking any action with respect to Bar Counsel's complaint letter. 
Barnard also asked the District Court for what amounted to an 
advisory opinion about whether Barnard's conduct constituted 
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. 
The Bar moved to have Barnard's Complaint dismissed on 
three bases: 
(1) The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
Barnard's Complaint because it sought an 
injunction and declaratory relief against the Bar 
6 
with respect to its disciplinary investigation of 
Barnard's conduct, a matter over which the Supreme 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction; 
(2) The Complaint did not present a case or 
controversy ripe for adjudication, but instead 
sought an advisory opinion of the court; and 
(3) The Bar is judicially immune from suit. 
After hearing and taking the matter under advisement, 
the court granted the Bar's Motion to Dismiss on July 19, 1991. 
The Bar respectfully submits that the District Court properly 
dismissed Barnard's Complaint and that its Order and the 
attendant Rule 11 sanctions should be affirmed. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Barnard is a member of the Utah State Bar and 
practices in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. [R. 2-3] 
2. The Utah State Bar is an unincorporated non-profit 
organization originally organized in 1931. In 1981, the Utah 
Supreme Court integrated the Utah State Bar. In re Integration 
and Governance of the Utah State Bar, 632 P.2d 845 (Utah 1981). 
At the same time, the Supreme Court adopted the "Rules for 
Integration of the Utah State Bar" and "Rules of Organization and 
Management of the Utah State Bar." Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 
158 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1991). [R. 83-90]. 
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3. In its "Rules for Integration of the Utah State 
Bar," the Utah Supreme Court perpetuated, created and continued 
the Bar under its exclusive direction and control. In re 
Integration and Governance of the Utah State Bar, supra. 
4. All decisions by the Bar and its authorized 
committees concerning the admission, suspension or disbarment of 
members of the Bar are advisory only to the Supreme Court, which 
retains the inherent power to admit, discipline or disbar members 
of the Bar. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 158 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1991). [R. 83-90]. 
5. Stephen Trost is Bar Counsel. Ralph Adams is 
Assistant Bar Counsel. Tony Marie Sutliff was formerly Associate 
Bar Counsel, but is no longer employed by the Bar. [See 
Affidavit of Ralph Adams ("Adams Aff.") «R 1]. [R. 111]. 
6. On or about November 8, 1989, Bar Counsel received 
from Judge Timothy Hanson, a Judge of the District Court, two 
transcripts of hearings which raised a question as to whether 
Barnard may have been assisting in the unauthorized practice of 
law. Based on that notification and the transcripts, Bar 
Counsel, on its own initiative, instituted an investigation 
concerning such activities with a complaint letter dated December 
26, 1990, a true and correct copy of which is appended to the 
Adams1 Affidavit as Exhibit "A". [R. 117]. That letter, in 
effect, requested information concerning the conduct identified 
as a possible violation of Rule 5.5(b) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. [Adams Aff., Uf 3, 4]. [R. 112]. 
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7. In response to said letter, Barnard sent Bar 
Counsel a letter dated January 2, 1991, a true and correct copy 
of which is appended to the Adams Affidavit as Exhibit "B" 
(excluding attachments) [R. 132-33], pursuant to which Barnard 
purported to respond and provide information concerning the 
complaint. [Adams Aff. 5 5]. [R. 112]. 
8. After receiving that response, the Bar Counsel 
wrote Barnard a second letter dated January 8, 1991, a true and 
correct copy of which is appended to the Adams Affidavit as 
Exhibit "C", requesting additional information concerning the 
matters subject of the complaint. [Adams Aff. J[ 6]. [R. 133]. 
9. Barnard did not respond to the second letter. 
Instead, Barnard filed the present action. [Adams Aff. 5 7]. 
[R. 113]. 
10. At the time the District Court heard Defendants1 
Motion to Dismiss, Bar Counsel had neither made a determination 
concerning the full scope and nature of Barnardfs activities 
identified in the complaint, nor had Bar Counsel presented the 
facts and circumstances to the Ethics and Discipline Committee 
(the "Committee"), its Panels, the Board of Commissioners, or the 
Utah Supreme Court. [Adams Aff. fl 8]. [R. 113]. 
11. Pursuant to the Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar, specifically Rule V thereof, Bar Counsel is 
charged with the responsibility to review and investigate all 
allegations and complaints of unethical or unprofessional conduct 
of a member of the Bar. Bar Counsel must preliminarily pass upon 
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and dispose of frivolous, insubstantial or unmeritorious 
complaints; and refer non-frivolous and substantial complaints to 
the Committee of the Utah State Bar. Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar, Rule V(b). [Adams Aff. 5 9]. [R. 113-14]. 
The first step taken in this instance by the Bar Counsel was to 
attempt to determine the nature of the subject conduct, which 
preliminary inquiry is the subject of Exhibits "A" and "C" 
appended to Adams1 Affidavit. [Adams Aff. 5 10]. [R. 114-15]. 
12. Upon completion of the preliminary investigation, 
the Bar Counsel is required to attempt to resolve the issue in 
the best interests of the lawyer and the public. Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, Rule VIII(e). If the complaint 
cannot be so resolved, or if the facts, by their nature, should 
be brought before the Committee, Bar Counsel serves upon the 
attorney a "Notice of Complaint11 identifying with particularity 
the possible violation(s) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The attorney has ten days in which to respond to the Complaint. 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, Rule VIII(e) and 
(f). Thereafter, the Complaint and the Answer are presented to a 
Screening Panel of the Committee for hearing, if not disposed of 
otherwise. At the Screening Panel hearing, the attorney against 
whom the complaint was filed has an opportunity to respond to the 
charges. The Screening Panel, on the basis of the complaint, 
answer, investigation and hearing, determines whether there is 
reasonable cause to find that the Rules of Professional Conduct 
have been violated. Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State 
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Bar, Rule IX (a) - (d). If the Panel decides there is reasonable 
cause to support a finding of a violation, the Panel may then 
vote for a Formal Committee Complaint. Procedures of Discipline 
of the Utah State Bar, Rule IX(d)(l)(e). A Hearing Panel is then 
assigned to the matter and may hold a formal hearing concerning 
the matter. Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, Rule 
XII(a). The Hearing Panel drafts findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and its recommendations. Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar, Rule XII(e). [Adams Aff. 5 10]. [R. 114-15]. 
13. After the Hearing Panel has drafted its findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations, those findings 
and recommendations go to the Board of Commissioners, which may 
approve, disapprove or remand the matter. If the Board of 
Commissioners approves the findings and recommendations and 
public discipline or greater sanction is involved, it is then 
sent to the Supreme Court. Procedures of the Utah State Bar, 
Rule XII, (e) and (g). [Adams Aff. 5 11]. [R. 115]. 
14. The findings sent to the Supreme Court are adopted 
"unless they are unsupported by the evidence and are arbitrary 
and capricious." [See In re Richard Calder, slip op. #890113, 
7/11/90 at p. 2]. With respect to recommendations for 
discipline, however, this Court treats them as advisory only and 
this Court has final authority to impose public discipline or 
sanctions upon a member of the Utah State Bar. [Adams Aff. fl 
12]. [R. 115-16]. 
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15. This Court is the only authorized body with the 
power and authority to promulgate rules concerning the regulation 
and practice of law, to regulate the practice of law and to 
discipline lawyers for their failure to adhere to such rules and 
regulations, Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 158 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3, 5 
(Utah 1991). [R. 83-90]. 
16. At the time Barnard filed suit and up to the time 
the District Court heard Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Bar 
had not completed the preliminary inquiry of the facts and 
circumstances concerning the subject complaint and had made no 
determination concerning its disposition. The Bar had not even 
issued a "Notice of Complaint" provided for in Rule VIII(e), 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. Accordingly, the 
Bar had not taken a position in any respect concerning the 
precise nature of Barnard's conduct subject of the complaint or 
whether he violated the Code of Professional Conduct. [Adams 
Aff. 51 12, 13 and 14]. [R. 116]. 
17. On or about August 2, 1989, Barnard filed a suit 
entitled Barnard v. Sutliff, et al. (the "Barnard v. Sutliff 
Suit") seeking, among other things, to enjoin the Bar from 
proceeding in a disciplinary action until and unless the Bar had 
revealed to Barnard the individual members of the Screening Panel 
to be involved in the investigation. Defendants filed a Motion 
to Dismiss. Barnard voluntarily dismissed the action on or about 
September 11, 1989 and immediately filed a "Verified Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ" before this Court. [R. 91-102]. In 
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paragraph 2 of his "Verified Petition for Extraordinary Writ", 
Barnard represented: 
This court [the Utah Supreme Court] has 
exclusive jurisdiction and the exclusive power 
to regulate the practice of law in the State of 
Utah, including discipline. Ut. Const., Art. 
VIII, § 4. 
18. Following the voluntary dismissal of the 
Barnard v. Sutliff Suit, Judge Timothy Hanson awarded 
sanctions against Barnard, finding that he had violated Rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to conduct 
reasonable research to determine that the District Court did 
not have jurisdiction over matters of attorney discipline. 
The award of sanctions against Barnard under the particular 
facts of that case is presently on appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
19. After the dismissal of the Barnard v. Sutliff 
Suit, Barnard filed another complaint entitled Barnard v. the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, Presiding Judge, the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, on Behalf of All 
of the Judges of that Court, and the Utah State Bar, Case No. 
900901433 CV, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the "Barnard v. Daniels 
Suit"). In the Barnard v. Daniels Suit, Barnard alleged, 
among other things, that he planned to sue the Bar in the 
future and was thus purporting to seek a judicial declaration 
that the District Court had original jurisdiction to hear and 
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resolve matters regarding rules, practices, policies and 
conduct of the Utah State Bar and its agents. 
20. Based on a Motion to Dismiss filed by the 
defendants, the Barnard v. Daniels Suit was dismissed on July 
9, 1990, long before Barnard commenced the present action. 
Barnard did not appeal that dismissal. 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over this matter because the Utah Supreme Court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the 
discipline of members of the Bar. 
2. Barnard's Complaint did not present a case or 
controversy, but merely sought an advisory opinion because the 
Bar had only recently commenced an investigation of Barnard's 
conduct and had made no determination with respect to his 
conduct. 
3. In any event, under Rule XVI(a) of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, the individual 
defendants are immune from suit with respect to any conduct in 
the course of their official responsibilities. 
4. Barnard knew or should have known this Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving discipline of 
members of the Bar, based not only on the relevant 
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constitutional statutory provisions, but also based on prior 
cases Barnard filed that had been dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. In fact, prior to filing the present lawsuit, 
Barnard had filed a Verified Petition for an Extraordinary 
Writ with this court affirming that this court has exclusive 
jurisdiction over such matters. 
5. Barnard knew or should have known that the 
Complaint he filed in this action did not present an 
appropriate case or controversy, but was asking merely for an 
advisory opinion because the Bar was only in the initial 
stages of its investigation and had made no determination one 
way or another about whether Barnard's conduct was appropriate 
or whether a formal disciplinary proceeding would be 
instigated against him. Even if there were case or 
controversy, Barnard would not have been entitled to 
declaratory relief because of the pendency of an appeal in the 
Barnard v. Sutliff suit. 
6. The District Court acted well within its 
discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions upon Barnard for his 
filing of the Complaint in this action because Barnard knew or 
should have know that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction 
over disciplinary matters, the Complaint fails to present a 
case or controversy, and the individual Defendants are immune 
from suit. 
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IX. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO GRANT 
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY BARNARD. 
Barnard sought in his Complaint a declaratory 
judgment that his conduct did not constitute assisting in the 
unauthorized practice of law, and an injunction against any 
related disciplinary action by the Bar. The District Court 
clearly lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief. 
From the establishment of the Bar in 1931, this 
Court has exclusively regulated the practice of law through 
its inherent judicial power. See In Re McCune, 717 P.2d 701, 
704 (Utah 1986); In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991, 
992 (Utah 1982); Ruckenbroad v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 559-60, 
133 P.2d 325, 330 (1943). 
In 1981, exercising its own independent and inherent 
power, this Court adopted Rules for Integration of the Bar. 
See In re Integration and Governance of the Utah State Bar, 
632 P.2d 845 (Utah 1981). Subsequent to the integration of 
the Bar, the Utah State Constitution was amended and Article 
VIII was expanded to make explicit the exclusive power of this 
Court to regulate the practice of law. In that respect, 
Article VIII, Section 4, states: 
The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the 
practice of law, including admission to 
16 
practice law and the conduct and discipline of 
persons admitted to practice law. 
Pursuant to its exclusive power to regulate the 
practice of law and upon the recommendation of the Utah State 
Bar, this Court has adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which incorporate Rule 5.5 entitled "Unauthorized Practice of 
Law," made the subject of Barnardfs Complaint. This Court has 
further adopted "Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar," 
setting forth the exclusive means by which lawyers are 
disciplined and sanctioned for violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Under the "Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar," the Bar is mandated by this Court to investigate 
complaints concerning violations of the Code of Professional 
Conduct, to conduct appropriate hearings thereon and to make 
recommendations concerning disposition to this Court. 
As this Court succinctly stated in its recent opinion 
in Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 158 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1991): 
The Utah State Bar assists this court in two 
regulatory functions. Under supervision of 
this court, the Bar administers qualifying 
examinations and investigates the moral fitness 
of applicants to practice law. The Bar also 
recommends proposed disciplinary actions to the 
court for those whom the Bar has preliminarily 
found to have violated the Code of Professional 
Conduct. The Bar has no final decision-making 
authority in these matters and acts only by 
recommending to the court appropriate action in 
all cases involving discipline and admissions. 
The court delegates those responsibilities to 
the Bar, which has no power to order 
disbarment, suspension, public reprimand or 
restitution of its own authority. See 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, 
Rule VII. 
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Id. at 5. [R. 88]. 
Because this Court holds and has retained exclusive 
jurisdiction concerning all disciplinary matters, the District 
Court was without jurisdiction to determine or otherwise 
render an advisory opinion or declaratory judgment concerning 
whether Barnard's conduct violated the Code of Professional 
Conduct. Barnard suggests that the constitutional and 
statutory underpinnings of this Court's authority to govern 
the practice of law establish only the exclusive rule-making 
authority of the Court and that this Court has no 
constitutional or statutory basis for exercising exclusive 
jurisdiction over the governance of the practice of law or 
discipline of members of the Bar. Barnard's whole argument 
overlooks the very rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to 
that legislative mandate, which clearly vest this Court with 
exclusive authority to make disciplinary decisions. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER 
BECAUSE BARNARD'S COMPLAINT PRESENTED NO CASE OR CONTROVERSY. 
As set forth in the Affidavit of Ralph Adams, and as 
Barnard admits in his Statement of Facts, the Bar had barely 
undertaken the initial steps in investigating the complaint 
against Barnard when Barnard filed this lawsuit. The Bar had 
made no determination concerning the precise conduct in which 
Barnard engaged, nor had it formed any opinion concerning 
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whether that conduct violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Entirely apart from the foregoing arguments on 
jurisdiction, even a perfunctory analysis of the posture of 
the case below should have led Barnard to the conclusion that 
his Complaint presented no case or controversy to the District 
Court.2 
If the initial investigation had been completed, Bar 
Counsel might have issued a Notice of Complaint, after which a 
Screening Panel of the Committee would have determined whether 
reasonable cause justified referring the matter to a Hearing 
Panel for a formal hearing procedure. Only after the Hearing 
Panel's disposition had been accepted by the Board of 
Commissioners could the Bar have decided to recommend to this 
Court that Barnard had violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. At that time, the Bar also would have recommended 
disposition as to the violation. The Bar would have made such 
a recommendation only after Barnard had exhausted his remedies 
with the Bar, not one of which, of course, had he exhausted at 
the time he filed this action. Therefore, the only possible 
case or controversy that might have arisen between the parties 
would have been the nature of the Bar's recommendation to this 
Court. 
By contrast, Barnard v. Sutliff at least involved a 
controversy about whether the names of the people composing the 
panel could or should be revealed to Barnard. 
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Accordingly, Barnard's complaint raised no case or 
controversy before the District Court. In effect, Barnard 
simply asked the District Court to anticipate the conduct of 
the Bar and render an advisory opinion about whether, in the 
event the Bar recommended action and in the event this Court 
accepted that recommendation and imposed discipline, such 
discipline would be appropriate. 
In Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978), this 
Court reversed a judgment of the District Court declaring a 
Utah statute unconstitutional. Discussing the principal that 
mandated reversal, the Court stated: 
[W]hile statutes authorizing courts to render 
declaratory relief should be liberally 
construed, the courts must nevertheless operate 
within the constitutional and statutory powers 
and duties imposed upon them. The courts are 
not a forum for hearing academic contentions or 
rendering advisory opinions. . . . 
To entertain an action for declaratory relief, 
there must be a justiciable controversy, for 
the courts do not give advisory opinions on 
abstract questions. The use of the term 
"rights, status and other legal relations" in 
the declaratory statute (§ 78-33-2, U.C.A. 
1953) relates to a justiciable controversy 
where there is an actual conflict between 
interested parties asserting adverse claims on 
an accrued state of facts as opposed to a 
hypothetical state of facts. 
When it is ascertained that there is no 
jurisdiction in the court because of an absence 
of a justiciable controversy, then the court 
can go no further, and its immediate duty is to 
dismiss the action. . . . 
Id. at 715-16 (emphasis added). 
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With specific respect to the Declaratory Judgments Act 
under which Barnard sought relief below, this court has stated 
that the Act is not designed for giving advisory opinions in a 
nonadversary action, or to insure against feared risk. Backman 
v. Salt Lake County, 375 P.2d 756 (Utah 1962). See also Crofts 
v. Crofts, 445 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1968) ("It is not the 
prerogative of the court to give opinions of contingent questions 
not properly before [it]. In the first place, the contingency 
may never occur. . . . " ) ; Backman v. Salt Lake County, 375 P.2d 
756, 759 (Utah 1962) (fl[T]he Declaratory Judgments Act is not 
designed for giving advisory opinions . . . to insure against 
feared risks."). 
The cases cited by Barnard are not to the contrary, as 
they simply identify such necessary elements as (1) a justiciable 
controversy based on an accrued state of facts and an actual 
conflict, (2) adverse interests of the parties, (3) a legally 
protectable interest in the controversy, and (4) ripeness for 
resolution. [Appellant's Brief at 20]. The only state of facts 
that had accrued when Barnard filed his Complaint was that the 
Bar was investigating his conduct. Barnard does not have a 
legally protectable interest in not being investigated by the 
Bar, nor does an impartial investigation make Barnard's interests 
adverse to those of the Bar. 
At the time Barnard filed his Complaint there had been 
no determination whatsoever about whether his conduct constituted 
assistance in the unauthorized practice of law. Consequently, 
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there could not have been a justiciable controversy or any issue 
that was ripe for judicial determination. In this regard, 
Barnard offers precious little to support his assertion that 
there was an accrued state of facts and an actual conflict. 
Barnard simply states that, "Defendants must have made an initial 
determination that the charges against Plaintiff have some 
potential validity." [Appellant's Brief at 22]. 
Perhaps most telling is Barnard's conclusion that his 
ongoing practice might subject him to further discipline and that 
halting his practice would seriously harm him and his firm 
financially. Perhaps if Barnard had been disciplined or had been 
forced to halt his practice, he would have been able to satisfy 
the requirements of justiciability and ripeness. As things stood 
when he filed his Complaint, however, he was simply making a 
quixotic attack on an imaginary windmill.3 
Further, as set forth above, this Court has 
specifically ruled that the Bar has no final decision-making 
authority on matters of disciplinary action and merely recommends 
to the Court what it believes to be appropriate action in a 
particular case. "The Court delegates those responsibilities to 
the Bar, which has no power to order disbarment, suspension, 
public reprimand or restitution of its own authority." Barnard 
v. Utah State Bar, 158 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah 1991). 
3
 Barnard's further suggestion that the Bar admits that a 
disciplinary action had been commenced is flatly incorrect as 
demonstrated above. 
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action was improper because the same issue was pending in a 
criminal case. This Court, affirming a dismissal by the District 
Court, stated the general rule as follows: 
Generally, jurisdiction of a declaratory 
judgment action will not be entertained if 
there is pending at the time of the 
commencement of the declaratory action another 
action or proceeding to which the same persons 
are parties and which are involved and may be 
adjudicated the identical issues which are 
involved in the declaratory judgment action. 
McCrae & DeLand, 669 P.2d at 405. The cited rationale for the 
rule was the court's interest in prohibiting piecemeal litigation 
of legal issues in multiple suits and to prevent needless 
proliferation of litigation. 
2. The Individual Defendants are Immune from Suit. 
The investigation Barnard tried to enjoin was 
undertaken by the Bar in accordance with its delegated 
responsibilities under the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar Promulgated by this Court. Pursuant to Rule XVI(a) of 
said procedures, this Court has specifically provided as follows: 
All members of the committee, board, hearing 
committees, bar counsel, disciplinary staff and 
other persons duly authorized to act in 
disciplinary proceedings under these rules 
shall be absolutely immune from civil suit . . 
. for any conduct in the course of their 
official responsibilities. 
That declaration is clear and unambiguous. Any practitioner 
reading it would be advised that functionaries of the Bar are 
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 Furthermore, even without the specific bar from suit 
mandated by the Court, when the Bar acts in i ts regulatory and 
disciplinary role as delegated by the Court it partakes f" the 
judiciary's immunity from suit. See Clark v. State of 
Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966); Lewis v. Supreme 
Court of Nevada, 490 F.Supp 1174, 1180 (D.C.Nev, 1980); Cawood v. 
Davis, 680 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tenn.App. 1984) 
and regulations adopted by this Court to govern the investigation 
of complaints against all lawyers, including Barnard. 
Second, the District Court's determination that it was 
without jurisdiction to enjoin the Bar in its official function, 
as an arm of this Court, from investigating the complaint against 
Barnard and making disciplinary recommendations thereon to the 
Court surely did not come as a surprise to Barnard. Indeed, 
Barnard had previously filed two suits that were dismissed 
precisely on the same ground before Barnard filed this suit. 
In Barnard v. Sutliff, Case No. 890904670, Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Barnard 
filed a complaint to enjoin the Bar from proceeding with a 
disciplinary action until and unless the Bar revealed to Barnard 
the individuals on the Screening Panel to be involved in the 
investigation. The Defendants in that case, Ms. Sutliff and the 
Bar, filed a Motion to Dismiss in response to which Barnard 
voluntarily dismissed the action. Barnard then filed a "Verified 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ" before the Utah Supreme Court. 
In paragraph 2 of that "Verified Petition for Extraordinary 
Writ," Barnard acknowledged his awareness that this Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting the discipline of 
attorneys when he represented to this court that: 
This court [the Utah Supreme Court] has 
exclusive jurisdiction and the exclusive power 
to regulate the practice of law in the State of 
Utah, including discipline. Ut.Cont. Art. 
VIII, § 4. 
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knew or should have known that the District 
Court lacked any jurisdiction with regard to 
matters pertaining to the discip1ine of 
attorneys, but rather original and exclusive 
jurisdiction for such matters rests with the 
Utah Supreme Court, At the v ery least, the 
plaintiff recognized the defect when he 
voluntarily dismissed this matter after m i n g 
a writ seeking the same relief before the Utah 
Supreme Court. [R. 106]. 
This Court is satisfied that had Mr, Barnard 
made a reasonable inquiry into the status of 
the law pertaining to the issues of 
jurisdiction regarding the nature of the 
controversy reflected in the present suit, tilat 
it would have been clear that the District 
Court was not an appropriate forum v/ithi n which 
to seek relief. On that basis, this Court 
determines that the plaintiff has failed to 
make proper i nquiry, and has therefore violated 
Rule ;I of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule II mandates sanctions, and the only 
sanction that would have any legitimate effect 
on the plaintiff to insure a reasonable inquiry 
as to the status of the law on the part of the 
p1ai nt i f f in the futur e, a nd t o restore the 
defendants financially because of the 
requirement to respond to this case improper]} 
filed in the District Court, is an award of 
attorney's fees. [R 107-08] 
That award of < ;;;ai i< : : t:i < : • i: :ts , i Su.t.11 ff i < i p r e s e i :t tJI y : i: appea 1 
before the Court. 
In the present case, Barnard has incorporated by 
reference the affidavits of eight other Salt Lake City attorneys 
that were exhibits to his Sutliff brief. In their affidavits, 
the eight other attorneys state they researched the issue and 
concluded that the Third District Court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over that case. [Appellant's Brief at 17]. 
Those affidavits are hardly availing to Barnard in the 
present case. Whatever the eight other attorneys concluded from 
their research with respect to the Sutliff suit, Barnard had 
already voluntarily dismissed that suit before filing the 
complaint in this case, and had thereafter expressly verified to 
this Court his actual knowledge of the Court's exclusive 
jurisdiction. Regardless of any academic inquiries into the 
jurisdictional issue, Barnard actually knew, or at the very least 
should have known, before he filed this action that the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction. 
Beyond that, after initiating the Barnard v. Sutliff 
suit, Barnard filed a complaint in the Third Judicial District 
Court entitled Barnard v. the Honorable Scott Daniels, Presiding 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
on Behalf of All of the Judges of That Court and the Utah State 
Bar, as Defendants, Case No. 900901433 CV ("Daniels11). In 
Daniels, Barnard claimed, among other things, that he planned to 
sue the Bar in the future and sought a judicial declaration that 
the District Court has original jurisdiction to hear and resolve 
matters regarding rules, practices, policies and conduct of the 
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Verified Petition that this Court "has exclusive jurisdiction 
over and the exclusive power to regulate the practice of law in 
the Utah of Utah, including discipline." The District Court's 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was therefore entirely proper, 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the judgment should be affirmed and the Bar awarded its 
costs and fees incurred on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this __ <^ day of May, 1992 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE 
EPHEN B\ MITCHELL V ST
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
30 
CERTIFICATE OF " MAILIl IG 
rhat four (4) true and correct copies 
of tl> 
this 
forir-j i na Appeiiee * :.= Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, 
_ ^ _ , t:l l e !: : Il I • :: x i :i i i g : 
Brian M. Barnard ;.nq. 
John Pace, Esq. 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East 500 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utrilhi HA 11 I - \ /i'04 
aw i i tahbai \ I » bi f 
78-2-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into efYect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(0 final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a s ta tute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments , and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those mat ters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (0. 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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CYHIRIT A 
78-3-4 J U D I C I A L < < »Dl' 
• Jurisdict ion — Transfer of cases to circuit 
court — Appeals — Jurisdiction when court does 
not exist [Effective January 1, 1992]. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and crimi-
nal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other 
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the Judicial 
Council and subject to policies established by the Judicial Council, cases filed 
in the district court, which are also within the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
circuit court, may be transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge of 
the district court in multiple judge districts or the district court judge in 
single judge districts. The transfer of these cases may be made upon the 
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party for adjudication. When 
an order is made transferring a case, the court shall transmit the pleadings 
and papers to the circuit court to which the case is transferred. The circuit 
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been originally commenced 
in the circuit court and any appeals from final judgments shall be to the Court 
of Appeals. 
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district, 
court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(5) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency adjudicative pro-
ceedings as set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act, 
and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 
(6) When a circuit court is given original or appellate jurisdiction of a 
matter and no such court exists in the county of proper venue, the district 
court shall have jurisdiction. Notwithstanding Section 78-3-14.5, criminal 
fines and forfeitures collected in such cases shall be distributed as if filed in 
the circuit court. Notwithstanding Section 78-3-16.5, civil filing fees in such 
cases shall be the same as if filed in the circuit court. The party filing a 
pleading or other document shall, at the time of filing, provide proof that the 
pleading or other document qualifies for the circuit court fee 
History: I 1951, ch . 58, § 1; C. 1943, tion (5) which formerly read T h e district court 
Supp., 104-3-4; L. 1983, ch- 75, § 2; 1986, ch. shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
47, § 50; 1987, ch. 161, § 305; 1988, ch- 248, 46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudica-
§ 10; 1991, ch. 268, § 23. tive proceedings" and made minor stylistic 
Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1992. — changes in Subsections (1) and (2). 
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 23 amends this section
 The i g 9 1 ^ ^ ^ effective January 1, 
effective January 1,1992. See amendment note
 1 9 9 2 lnserted "Administrative Procedures 
D€lOW 
. ' , . x r . . ™ ,„„„ , Act" and made a related punctuation chanee in 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
 c , .. ,_. , , , j „ , .. ,,.,6 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, rewrote Subsec- b u b s e c t l o n ( 5 ) - ™d a d d e d Subsection (6). 
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PYUIRIT R 
